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economic distortions and uncertainty.
When consumers and businesses come
to realize that the purchasing power of
their money is declining, they look for
ways to avoid holding that money.
Those of us who remember the 1970s
can attest to the deep troubles brought
on by spiraling inflation.  
Over the past couple of decades, we have
seen growing public support for a return
to low inflation, not just in the United
States, but around the world.  Inflation in
the industrialized countries fell from 
9 percent in the first half of the 1980s to 
2 percent early in this decade.  But even
more impressive was the huge decline in
inflation among the developing nations
—from roughly 30 percent to 6 percent—
during those same two decades.
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The economy has been expanding for
the past few years, but concerns are
growing over the pressures placed on
it by fiscal deficits, current account
imbalances, and energy shocks. San-
dra Pianalto, president and CEO of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land, explains why she thinks the
Federal Reserve can best meet those
challenges and promote economic
prosperity by maintaining price sta-
bility. This Commentary contains the
text of her remarks to the Levy Eco-
nomics Institute of Bard College on
April 21, 2005.
Iam beginning my third year as presi-
dent and CEO of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland and as a participant
of the Federal Open Market Committee,
the Federal Reserve’s policymaking
arm.  I will tell you that I have seen
more than a few twists and turns in the
path of the economy during that time. 
The economy has been expanding for
the past few years, but many people
seem to think that, in spite of its funda-
mental underlying strength, the econ-
omy could face some challenges from
fiscal and trade deficits. Today, I would
like to explain how I think central banks
can best meet those challenges and pro-
mote economic prosperity—by main-
taining price stability, or low and stable
rates of inflation. I will talk about three
aspects of this message.
First, we have achieved a global consen-
sus that central banks should pursue
price stability. 
Second, while large budget deficits are
clearly undesirable and may add some
complexity to monetary policy decision-
making, they do not need to undermine
our success in maintaining price stability.
Finally, a firm commitment to price sta-
bility is the best contribution monetary
policy can make toward resolving the
challenges posed by external account
imbalances.
Please note that the views I express
today are mine alone. I do not presume
to speak for any of my colleagues in the
Federal Reserve System.
n  The Price Stability 
Consensus
Let me begin by explaining why I
believe we have achieved a global con-
sensus in support of price stability. We
know that central banks have a rather
checkered past when it comes to the pur-
suit of price stability. Throughout human
history, when governments became
involved with money, inflation typically
followed. That is because when eco-
nomic times got tough, or budgets were
pinched, governments often yielded to
the temptation to cheapen the value of
money by printing too much of it, or
sometimes by minting lighter coins. Per-
haps they were trying to stimulate faster
economic growth, or perhaps they were
simply trying to finance their own
spending without raising taxes. But
whatever the reason, the result was the
same—economies eventually suffered
under an inflationary policy.
Even as early as the 14th century, the
dangers of inflation were discussed. In
The Inferno, Dante writes about the fate
of counterfeiters and other “falsifiers of
money”—the people who were responsi-
ble for devaluing the currency. He places
them in one of the deepest parts of hell.
Again in the third book of his Divine
Comedy, Dante predicts a terrible fate
for two officials who debased their cur-
rencies. According to a translator, Dante
envisioned this severe punishment not
because he loved money, but because he
believed that a sound coinage—or sound
money—was an essential principle of
social order.
Thankfully, we are not so severe with
those who create inflation today. But we
do understand that sooner or later, infla-
tion introduces all sorts of costly Dramatic reductions in inflation have
also been accompanied by improved
economic performance in many coun-
tries. In the United States, real output
growth has been higher, the frequency
of business cycles has declined, and the
swings in the business cycle seem to
have become milder. Federal Reserve
Board Governor Ben Bernanke, whom
President Bush recently nominated to
chair his Council of Economic Advisers,
is one observer who calls this post-
inflation era “the Great Moderation.”
People may disagree about how much
of the improvement in economic
growth and financial stability is the
result of non-inflationary monetary
policies, how much is due to structural
changes in national economies, and
how much we can chalk up to just plain
good luck. But I am convinced that this
improved performance would not have
been possible and could not have been
sustained if central banks had not sup-
pressed the urge to solve problems
through inflation.
The consensus support for price stabil-
ity among central banks has clearly
made an important difference to the
public and to their governments, and it
remains strong around the world.  In
fact, some nations have chosen to set
explicit numerical inflation-rate objec-
tives for their central banks. Others, like
the United States, have been successful
without them. I believe that overall, cen-
tral banks are aiming in a similar direc-
tion: to promote sustained economic
growth by maintaining low and stable
inflation rates. 
n  Monetary Policy in an Era 
of Fiscal Deficits: More 
Difficult, Not Impossible
Let me turn now to the issue of whether
large budget deficits may undermine
central banks’success in maintaining
low and stable inflation rates.
In the United States, current budget
deficits, as well as prospective deficits
over the immediate horizon, seem to be
well within the boundaries of historical
experience. Relative to the size of gross
domestic product, recent government
budget shortfalls are still substantially
below the peak levels of the 1980s. Nev-
ertheless, the public is expressing grow-
ing concerns about fiscal discipline. In
the United States, these concerns have
been provoked by the rapid increase in
the federal budget deficit, to about 3-1/2
percent of GDP in 2004, from a budget
surplus in 2001. And the concerns are
not unique to our own country. In
Europe, we have seen a revision of the
Growth and Stability Pact, which origi-
nally required euro countries to maintain
fiscal deficits below 3 percent of GDP. 
The current level of budget deficits cer-
tainly understates the magnitude of fiscal
pressures. Both the United States and
Europe face demographic changes where
we see entitlement liabilities growing
faster than the tax base available to sup-
port them. While these issues are not
new, they are serious and should be
addressed sooner rather than later. 
Of course, resolving fiscal imbalances 
is not the job of monetary policymakers,
but that does not mean that we can
ignore their consequences. The stance 
of monetary policy—that is, whether a
specific setting of the federal funds rate
target is determined to be “tight,” “easy,”
or “neutral”—depends on the level of
what economists usually refer to as 
the “equilibrium real interest rate.” This
is the interest rate that would match 
the demand for funds with their supply,
assuming that markets are working 
efficiently. 
It is not unreasonable to expect that per-
sistent government deficits will eventu-
ally yield upward pressure on the equi-
librium real interest rate. If central banks
want to maintain their intended policy
stance, they will need to respond to this
pressure with corresponding movements
in their policy rates. This process would
be easier if the equilibrium real interest
rate could be readily estimated—but it
cannot. In the United States, with the
shift from fiscal surplus to deficit, we
now have the added complication of try-
ing to incorporate the effects of fiscal
imbalances on changes in the equilib-
rium real interest rate. 
Of course, any change in the economic
environment that puts pressure on inter-
est-rate fundamentals could introduce
the same complication. But, unlike many
other complicating factors, large and
persistent fiscal deficits introduce
another risk—namely, that they could be
the source of inflationary pressures. 
However, there is no need for deficits to
be inflationary. The prospect of inflation
arises only if the central bank ignores or,
even worse, tries to resist any rise in real
interest rates. By doing so, the central
bank would keep its policy rates too low
and inadvertently ease monetary policy.
Of course, the real risk of an excessively
stimulative monetary policy is that infla-
tion expectations may eventually
become unanchored. History shows that
once inflation expectations become
unstable, more stringent policy actions
might be required. 
A central-bank commitment to price sta-
bility can avoid that outcome. A central
bank cannot always offset the effects of
government deficits on economic
growth and stability. But the more credi-
ble the central bank’s commitment to
price stability, the less likely it is that an
inflation premium will be built into mar-
ket interest rates, and the less likely it is
that rising inflation expectations will
distort economic decisions. 
I believe that the FOMC is trying very
hard to preserve its credibility by being
clear and unwavering in its commitment
to low and stable inflation. However, it
goes without saying that our job is made
easier if the public expects that the fiscal
authorities will address budgetary
imbalances in a timely and effective
fashion.
n  Monetary Policy in an Era 
of Current Account Deficits 
Now I would like to discuss how mone-
tary policy can best contribute to resolv-
ing the challenges brought by external
account imbalances. Substantial current
account deficits developed in the 1980s,
and these deficits now stand at record
postwar levels as a share of GDP. I think
everyone agrees that these levels are
unsustainable, and that a reversal is
inevitable, even if the timing and pace of
the adjustment are uncertain.
Some people envision a soft landing. As
we all know, a return to current account
balance will ultimately require that U.S.
households consume less and save more
of their incomes. Households could
become concerned about having enough
money for future consumption and step
up their saving, even at today’s interest
rates. The more commonly expected
scenario, though, is that foreign savingscoming into the United States could
become less plentiful over time, driving
up interest rates. Then, households
might be induced to save more and
spend less. 
If a substantial turnaround in U.S. cur-
rent account deficits results in higher
equilibrium real interest rates, the
FOMC would most likely need to
adjust its federal funds rate target
accordingly to prevent a change in its
policy stance. It is also possible that a
decline in the exchange value of the
dollar could result in temporary upward
pressure on the price level, due to rising
import prices and the prices of import-
competing goods. The first responsibil-
ity of the central bank is to ensure that
these price pressures do not feed into
higher inflation expectations in the long
run. Once again, a clear commitment to
price stability—in words and deeds—is
the best contribution the central bank
can make to the adjustment process
toward more sustainable external
account positions.
The soft-landing point of view is really
just the expectation that the process of
adjustment will be a smooth one. I
believe that a gradual and orderly tran-
sition toward smaller current account
deficits is the probable outcome. But of
course, there are those who believe that
the landing might not be so soft—and
that the reversal of our large current
account deficits will be sudden and 
disruptive.
Those who imagine this worst-case sce-
nario seem to have in mind a magnified
version of the stress on global financial
markets that emerged in the last half of
1998. Of course, they believe that the
impact on the U.S. economy would be
more severe this time because our own
imbalances would be at issue. In these
circumstances, it is difficult to predict
what the specific course of monetary
policy ought to be, but the usual answer
to financial market crises is for the cen-
tral bank to provide enough liquidity to
short-circuit systemic market failure.
How, then, should monetary policy deal
with current account imbalances today?
I do not think that the FOMC should
take preemptive measures to address
these imbalances. However, I do think
that the Committee should continue to
bring the federal funds rate target to a
level that is consistent with maintaining
price stability in the long run. If we
achieve that, then we will be in a posi-
tion of strength to address whatever
challenges arise.
n  Conclusion
Over the past 20 years, price stability
has achieved some remarkable things. It
has contributed to better real economic
performance through less volatile inter-
est rates, it has allowed resources to be
allocated more efficiently, and it has
contributed to healthier financial sys-
tems. But nations must inevitably con-
tend with economic issues that mone-
tary policy cannot solve.
In the long run, a central bank cannot
balance the government’s budget, boost
national saving, create more energy
resources, or solve the many economic
problems that we must confront. But a
credible monetary policy will help
smooth the adjustment to economic cir-
cumstances that come our way. 
I hope that my comments have helped to
clarify why I believe that price stability
is the most important contribution that
central banks can make to economic
prosperity. The best way for an econ-
omy to adjust to challenges like govern-
ment deficits and current account
deficits is in an environment of low
inflation and stable inflation expecta-
tions. That is the contribution that the
Federal Reserve can reasonably deliver,
and it is the contribution that I intend to
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